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i, i »in 1 il inn prei eclnul li» i f ilanzich's liability on his Guaranty had never been fully funded.
If the Lonettis had prevailed on their claim against Bilanzich, they would have been
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Bilanzich is entitled to recover his reasonable attorney's fees incurred in establishing that
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parties - - clearly and unambiguously state the agreement
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Lonettis' right to appeal the partial summary judgment granted in Bilanzich's favor. The
written agreement between the parties contains no provision for release or dismissal of
Bilanzich's claim for attorney's fees (or any other claims for that matter).

II.
ARGUMENT

A. BILANZICH IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER THE
ATTORNEYS FEE PROVISION CONTAINED IN THE GUARANTY.
The attorneys fee provision contained in the Guaranty provides:
This Guaranty includes all principal, interest, costs, expenses and attorney's
fees incurred in collection of the Note and in realization of the security.
[Emphasis Added]
The Lonettis attempt to unreasonably restrict this language by arguing that it only made
Bilanzich liable for attorney's fees incurred by the Lonettis in litigating with REI to
recover on the Note. Not surprisingly, the Lonettis have been unable to cite any cases to
support their argument. This attempted restriction is without merit.
Bilanzich guaranteed payment of the Note. The Lonettis' suit against Bilanzich to,
in their words, "enforce the Guaranty" was a suit to collect the Note. Consequently,
under the attorney's fee provision of the Guaranty, Bilanzich was liable not only for
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attorney's fees incurred by the Lonettis in litigation with REI for "collection of the Note/'
but for attorney's fees incurred by the Lonettis in litigation with Bilanzich "for collection
of the Note" if the Lonettis prevailed. Thus, under the reciprocal attorney's fee statute,
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5, Bilanzich is entitled to recover his attorney's fees under the
Guaranty.1
The Lonettis do not dispute that in Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Cardinal Fuels, Inc., 872
F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1989), the Fourth Circuit upheld a judgment for attorney's fees based
on a guarantee that provided the guarantor would pay "reasonable attorney's fees incurred
in collection of the note." The Lonettis have been unable to even attempt a logical or
legal critique of this holding, and have been relegated to arguing that this court should
ignore that decision because the Fourth Circuit's opinion did not contain further analysis
or discussion of the issue. The issue did not need further analysis or discussion. The fact
that suit upon a guaranty to recover the note was a suit for collection of the note was a
tautology, as it is in the present case.

1

The Lonettis imply in their brief that some special rule applies to the
interpretation of a contract for attorney's fees that requires an "unambiguous and clear
reference to recovery of fees by the prevailing party as a result of some triggering
mechanism contained within the terms of the contract at issue." [Lonetti Brief at 11] In
truth, attorney's fee provisions are construed under the same rules as any other contractual
provision, as the cases cited by the Lonettis demonstrate. See Wardley Corp. v. Welsh,
962 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah App. 1998).
3

The cases cited by the Lonettis to attempt to support their argument regarding the
interpretation of the Guaranty involved significantly different attorney's fee provisions
than contained in the Bilanzich Guaranty, are not of assistance in interpreting the
attorney's fee provision in the Guaranty (or the Note) and do not cast any doubt upon
Bilanzich's right to recover attorney's fees. For example, in Carr v. Enoch Smith Co.,
781 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Utah App. 1989), cited by the Lonettis, the attorney's fee clause
provided that a party failing to perform the agreement "agrees to pay all expenses of
enforcing this agreement, or of any right arising out of the breach thereof, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." [Emphasis Added] The court held that the defendant was not
entitled to attorney's fees because he only defended and did not seek enforcement of the
agreement. The court noted that the defendant would have been entitled to attorney's fees
under a typical prevailing party provision. The court did not consider the effect of the
reciprocal attorney's fee statute because the contract was entered into before the statute
became effective.
The Lonettis' newfound argument that the Guaranty does not contain an attorney's
fee provision with respect to the Lonettis' suit against Bilanzich is belied by the fact that
the Lonettis sought an award of attorney's fees in both their complaint against Bilanzich
and in their answer to Bilanzich's complaint. [R. 2501 & 85] The Lonettis argue that the
fact they sought attorney's fees under the language of the Guaranty is irrelevant because
4

the fact that one party has prayed for attorney's fees does not change the contractual
language. [Lonetti Brief at 13] However, where the parties place their own construction
on a contract and so perform, a court can consider this persuasive evidence of the parties'
true intentions and the contract should be enforced in accordance with the manner in
which the parties have construed it. Zeese v. Estate ofSiegel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah
1975). Moreover, under Rule 11, U.R.C.P., the Lonettis could only seek attorney's fees if
they had a good faith, reasonable basis for seeking those fees. Clearly, the Lonettis'
change of position on attorney's fees springs from the fact that Bilanzich successfully
defended against their claim.

B. BILANZICH IS ALSO ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES
BY VIRTUE OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEE PROVISION CONTAINED IN THE
NOTE.
Even if it were (incorrectly) assumed for purposes of argument that Bilanzich is
not entitled to recover under the attorney's fee provision contained in the Guaranty, that
fact would not assist the Lonettis because the modification to the Note itself contained an
attorney's fee provision.
The Lonettis argue that Bilanzich cannot avail himself of this provision because
Bilanzich was not a party to the Note and cite cases that one who is not a party to an
agreement is not entitled to the benefit of the attorney's fee provision contained in the
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agreement. Bilanzich has no quarrel with the general proposition that only parties to an
agreement which provides for attorney's fees are entitled to recover attorney's fees under
that agreement. The Lonettis ignore the fact, however, that Bilanzich guaranteed payment
of all of REI's obligations contained in the Note. Bilanzich's obligations were, therefore,
governed by the terms of the Note in addition to the terms of the Guaranty. One of those
obligations contained in the Note was the obligation to pay attorney's fees incurred by the
Lonettis in successfully collecting on the Note:
If any action is instituted with respect to this Agreement or supporting
documents, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of attorney's
fees and costs to be paid by the other party. [R. 2442]
This provision - - as well as the other provisions of the Note - - were effectively a part of
Bilanzich's Guaranty. The Lonettis instituted action against Bilanzich with respect to the
Note. Had they prevailed, they would have been entitled to recover fees incurred in
litigating with Bilanzich to collect the Note. Bilanzich was the prevailing party.
Accordingly, Bilanzich is entitled to recover attorney's fees against the Lonetlis under the
Note. Bilanzich is also entitled to recover attorney's fees under the reciprocal attorney's
fee statute, §78-27-56.5 because the Lonettis' suit against Bilanzich was a suil based upon
an agreement which allowed one party to recover fees within the meaning of the statute.2

2

The Lonettis argue for the first time on appeal that in any event the modification
to the Note was governed by Nevada law and that Nevada does not have a reciprocal
attorney's fee statute. [Lonetti Brief at 14-15] Because this argument was not raised in the
6

The Lonettis want the court to ignore Connecticut Natl Bank v. Foley, 560 A.2d
475 (Conn. App. 1989), cited by Bilanzich, which is directly on point. In Foley, the
guarantor agreed to pay "any other charges, fees or expenses owed by the borrower under
the loan agreement." Id. at 478 n.2. The note obligated the borrower to pay "reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in collection of all or part of his note." Id. at 478. The court
determined that because the borrower was obligated to pay any attorney's fees incurred in
collecting the note, including attorney's fees incurred in collecting on the guarantee of the
note, the guarantor was likewise obligated to pay such attorney's fees.
The Lonettis are unable to challenge the Foley court's reasoning, but can only
argue that the opinion should be ignored because the court said the issue required "little
discussion," and did not engage in a lengthy analysis. Again, the issue did not require
lengthy analysis, as is perhaps best demonstrated by the Lonettis' inability to
substantively criticize the holding. The Lonettis also argue that the Foley decision "is not
enough to displace the rules governing recovery of attorney's fees under a contract
pursuant to Utah law." [Lonetti Brief at 12] However, the same rules applicable to

district court, it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Ellis v. Swensen, 2000
UT 101, P 0 , 16 P.3d 1233; Warburton v. Virginia Beach Sav. & Loan Assoc, 899 P.2d
797, 782 n.5 (Utah App. 1995). Moreover, the modification only provided that Nevada
law would "govern the construction and interpretation of this Agreement." [See
Appellees' Brief, Add. A ^|4] [Emphasis Added] The modification did not provide that
Nevada law would govern the substantive rights of the parties under the Note and
modification.
7

attorney's fees in Utah applied in Foley and the Lonettis do not suggest what Utah rules
would have to be "displaced".
The Lonettis rely on Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., 2001 UT
App. 341, 37 P.3d 267, to attempt to support their argument that because Bilanzich was
not a party to the Note, he cannot rely on its attorney's fee provision. The situation in
Anglin was far different. In Anglin, suit was brought on a promissory note which
contained an attorney's fee provision. The plaintiff obtained a pre-judgment writ of
garnishment on Custom Steel Fabrication which company was successful in dissolving
the writ of garnishment. The court held the garnishee was not entitled to attorney's fees
because it was not a party to the promissory note and, therefore, the reciprocal attorney's
fee statute did not apply. Unlike Bilanzich in the case at bar, the garnishee's rights and
obligations were completely unrelated to the promissory note.
Bilanzich is entitled to recover attorney's fees under the attorney's fee provision
contained in the Guaranty. Even if he were not so entitled, he is entitled to recover under
the attorney's fee provision contained in the Note both as the prevailing party and under
§78-27-56.5.
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C. THE FACT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT RULED THAT THE
GUARANTY WAS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO LIABILITY HAD NOT OCCURRED DOES NOT DEFEAT
BILANZICH'S RIGHT TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The Lonettis argue that the district court ruled that the Guaranty was a nullity
which deprived Bilanzich of any right to recover attorney's fees under the Guaranty.
[Lonetti Brief at 15] This argument is incorrect.
Bilanzich did not argue that the Guaranty had not been validly formed by the
parties and the district court did not hold that the Guaranty was void ab initio. Instead,
Bilanzich argued that he was not liable under the Guaranty that had been validly entered
into because a condition precedent to his liability - - REI obtaining a $3.5 Million
construction loan - - had never occurred.
The effect of the non-occurrence of a condition precedent is explained in §225
Restatement (Second) of Contracts as follows:
(1) Performance of a duty subject to a condition cannot become due
unless the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is excused.
(2) Unless it has been excused, the non-occurrence of a condition
discharges the duty when the condition can no longer occur.
In other words, the non-occurrence of a condition precedent as in the present case does
not void the contract, but simply excuses a party's obligation to perform under the
contract. This court has recognized that the effect of a failure of a condition precedent is
9

to relieve a party of an obligation to perform. See Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210,
213 (Utah App. 1988); Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 281 (Utah
App. 1987).
The Lonettis tell the court that BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah
1978) is the "seminal and controlling case on this issue". [Lonetti Brief at 15] BLT is not
controlling. In BLT, the sellers successfully argued that no contract had been formed
because the parties had not agreed to the terms of an escrow agreement to protect the
sellers and, therefore, specific performance could not be obtained by the buyer. The trial
court granted rescission based on breach of fiduciary duty. The Supreme Court held that
because the sellers had "disaffirmed in its entirety" the contract, they could not recover
attorney's fees, reasoning that the sellers could not "void the contract and, at the same
time, claim the benefits of the provision for attorney's fees." Id. at 458. In the present
case, Bilanzich did not claim that the Guaranty agreement had not been formed, Bilanzich
did not disaffirm the Guaranty in its entirety and the court did not rescind and void the
Guaranty. Equally important, BLT was decided before the reciprocal attorney's fee
statute was enacted, and therefore did not consider the effect of the statute on the issue.3

3

Lonetti argues that Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App. 404, 38 P.3d 1001, "makes
clear that BLThas survived the enactment of 78-27-56.5, and is the current state of law in
Utah on this issue." [Lonetti Brief at 16] However, in Chase v. Scott, the attorney's fee
provision only provided for attorney's fees in "litigation . . . to enforce" the contract.
This court ruled that the defendant who successfully defended an action for rescission of
10

Moreover, even if the district court's decision in the case at bar had the effect of
rescinding or voiding the Guaranty (which it did not), Bilanzich should still be entitled to
recover his attorney's fees under §78-27-56.5. The Lonettis wholly ignore the substantial
body of case law decided in other states permitting recovery of attorney's fees in such
circumstances that was cited in Bilanzich's opening brief [pp. 14-16], and do not even
attempt to distinguish or criticize these cases or to cite any contrary cases.
In Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., 2001 UT App. 341 at %\ 1,
this court recognized that the purpose of §78-27-56.5 was to "creat[e] a level playing field
for all parties to a promissory note." Bilanzich clearly prevailed "in a civil action based
upon any promissory note, written contract or other writing executed after April 28, 1986,
where the provisions of the promissory note, written contract or other writing allow at

the contract was entitled to recover attorney's fees under that provision, adopting the
reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in First Colony Life Insurance Co. v. Berube, 130 F.3d
827 (8th Cir. 1997) that a successful defense of an action to rescind came within an
attorney's fee provision granting attorney's fees for enforcement of the contract. This
court in dicta noted that its ruling was consistent with BLT "limiting awards under this
type of contractual provision [i.e., providing for attorney's fees for enforcement of the
contract] to only those parties who successfully defend against rescission and, thus,
enforce the contract and that the holding was also consistent with §78-27-56.5 because
either party that successfully defended against rescission would be entitled to recover fees
under the Contract." This court did not analyze the continued vitality of BLT in view of
§78-27-56.5. Further, because the party seeking to rescind in Chase v. Scott was
unsuccessful, this court had no occasion to rule on the issue of whether a party
successfully seeking to rescind would be entitled to recover attorney's fees under the
reciprocal attorney's fee statute.
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least one party to recover attorney's fees" as required by the statute. Had the Lonettis
successfully sued Bilanzich to collect on the Note, they would have been entitled to
recover their attorney's fees. The Lonettis have not and cannot explain how denying
Bilanzich his attorney's fees creates a level playing field. It would not. Such a result
would be fundamentally unfair and at odds with the purpose and intent of the statute. The
Lonettis should not be given a free shot at going after Bilanzich for millions of dollars,
including their attorney's fees.

D. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT BILANZICH AGREED TO
RELEASE HIS CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The final argument the Lonettis raise is that Bilanzich's motion for attorney's fees
is supposedly barred by a settlement agreement between the Lonettis and Bilanzich. The
Lonettis argue that their counsel understood that under the settlement agreement the
Lonettis would have no liability for attorney's fees incurred by Bilanzich even though
such a provision was never discussed or agreed to by counsel or contained in the written
pleadings that the Lonettis concede were prepared to document the agreement. The
Lonettis' argument is without merit, and should be rejected. The parties did not execute a
settlement agreement, did not mutually release all claims against each other, and there is
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no evidence that the Lonettis bargained for or paid any consideration for a release of all
claims or for the release of Bilanzich's claim for attorney's fees.
The Lonettis argue that a settlement agreement is not required to be in writing.
However, an agreement to pay attorney's fees is required to be in writing. See Wardley
Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah App. 1998). Thus, any agreement to release an
obligation to pay attorney's fees is required to be in writing. See Strevell-Paterson Co.,
Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741, 741 (Utah 1982). Even more fundamentally, the agreement
in the case at bar was in writing, as conceded by the Lonettis.
In his January 15, 2004 letter which the Lonettis rely upon, Bilanzich's attorney,
Jefferson W. Gross, stated to Lonettis' counsel that:
. . . Mr. Bilanzich will proceed on one of two alternative routes:
1. If John Lonetti, Eunes Lonetti and JDL Holdings, L.C., waive their
right to appeal Judge Shumate's Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment,
Mr. Bilanzich will dismiss his claim for rescission with prejudice; or
2. Mr. Bilanzich will continue to pursue his claim for rescission against
your clients. [R. 2460-2461. See Appellees Brief, Add. D]
There is not one word in Mr. Gross's letter about waiving any right to recover attorney's
fees based upon Bilanzich's successful defense that he was not liable for payment of the
Note under his Guaranty.
On February 12, 2004, the Lonettis signed a "JOINT MOTION AND
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AND EIGHTH CLAIMS
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FOR RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS JOHN LONETTI, EUNES LONETTI AND
JDL HOLDINGS, L.L.C." by which the parties:
[j Jointly move[d] for, and stipulate[d] to, the dismissal of Plaintiff s Sixth
Claim for Relief (for rescission) and Eighth Claim for Relief (for unjust
enrichment) (as set forth in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint) against
John Lonetti, Eunes Lonetti and JDL Holdings, L.L.C, with prejudice. [R.
2409-11]
Pursuant to that motion and stipulation, on March 10, 2004, the court entered an
"ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AND
EIGHTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS JOHN LONETTI, EUNES
LONETTI AND JDL HOLDINGS, L.L.C." that was approved as to form by the Lonettis'
counsel by which the court dismissed Bilanzich Sixth and Eighth Claims for Relief with
prejudice. [R. 2421-23]
The joint motion and stipulation did not contain any provision for release or
dismissal of Bilanzich's attorney's fees incurred with respect to the claims on which the
court had already ruled in Bilanzich's favor and the court's order contained no such
release or dismissal.
On March 10, 2004, the court also entered its "JUDGMENT RESOLVING
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES BETWEEN MICHAEL T. BILANZICH AND
DEFENDANTS JOHN LONETTI, EUNES LONETTI AND JDL HOLDINGS, L.L.C."
by which the court entered judgment that Bilanzich was not liable on the Note because the
14

condition precedent to his liability on the Guaranty had not occurred and that the claims
of JDL Holdings in its complaint against Bilanzich to recover the amount due on the Note
pursuant to the Guaranty were dismissed with prejudice. [R. 2424-26] Again, there was
no dismissal of Bilanzich's claim for attorney's fees under the Guaranty and Note. The
Lonettis did not object to the form of the judgment or contend at the time that Bilanzich's
claim for attorney's fees should be dismissed.
The only "evidence" that the Lonettis cite in their brief for their argument that the
settlement released any attorney's fee claim is the affidavits of their attorneys, Terry L.
Wade and Bryan J. Pattison. The affidavits do not contain admissible evidence and are
insufficient to prove any agreement in addition to or inconsistent with the parties' written
agreement contained in the pleadings and order recited above.
Mr. Wade states in his affidavit [R. 2455-57] that (a) Mr. Gross offered to dismiss
Bilanzich's remaining causes of action against Lonetti if Lonetti would refrain from filing
an appeal; (b) that Mr. Wade made "the fact clear" to Mr. Gross that the Lonettis would
not waive their right to appeal unless they were confident that the Lonettis would not face
further claims by anyone; (c) that Mr. Gross never mentioned any claim to recover
attorney's fees from the Lonettis; and (d) that thereafter Mr. Gross prepared the pleadings
to effect the settlement. Mr. Pattison merely states in his affidavit [R. 2446-47] that his
"understanding" of the dismissal of the litigation was that the Lonettis would have no
15

further liability to Bilanzich. Of course, the subjective, uncommunicated understanding
and intent of the Lonetti attorneys that the settlement would release any claim that
Bilanzich had for recovery of attorney's fees is simply irrelevant under the objective
theory of contracts. See Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins. Group, 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah
1983).
Importantly, neither Mr. Wade nor Mr. Pattison claim that Mr. Gross agreed to
waive any right to recover attorney's fees on the claims that had already been decided in
Bilanzich's favor or that there was even any discussion of attorney's fees or any mutual
release of all claims.
The pleadings that Mr. Wade acknowledges Mr. Gross prepared "to effect the
settlement" contained no release or dismissal of Bilanzich's claim for attorney's fees.
Because those documents were admittedly intended to effect the settlement, those
documents constituted an integration. See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. The Canopy Group, Inc.,
2004 UT. App. 162 at T|14, 92 P.3d 768; Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180,
191 (Utah App. 1997). Therefore, extrinsic evidence concerning what the Lonettis'
attorneys now say they understood and intended was inadmissible to vary, add to or
contradict the provisions of the pleadings memorializing the settlement. Id4

4

In similar circumstances, federal courts in civil rights cases have held that even
settlement agreements that waive all claims do not waive a claim for attorney's fees
unless the agreements expressly waive attorney's fees and that extrinsic evidence of the
16

Moreover, even if the understanding and intent of the Lonettis' attorneys could be
considered in determining the agreement reached by the parties, the affidavits were far
too conclusory and general to constitute admissible evidence. See, e.g., Norton v.
Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (". . . the plaintiffs statements in her affidavit
are largely conclusory in form, did not state with specificity what words were spoken by
defendant (as opposed to her own conclusions), and therefore would not be admissible in
evidence . . . .".); Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980); Brown
v. Wanlass, 2001 UT. App. 30 at f7, 18 P.3d 1137, 1139; Robertson v. Utah Fuel
Company, 889 P.2d 1382, 1388 (Utah App. 1995) ("'unsubstantiated opinions and
conclusions' are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment."). In this regard,
conclusory testimony that an oral agreement existed without specific facts establishing the
making and terms of the claimed agreement is insufficient to establish such an agreement.
See, e.g., Shank v. Hague, 192 F.3d 674, 681-682 (7th Cir. 1999) (self-serving conclusory
affidavit without factual support was insufficient to establish the existence of an oral
contract); Abacus Real Estate Finance Co. v. P.A.R. Construction and Maintenance

course of negotiations or the expectations of the parties is irrelevant. See Torres v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 189 F.3d 331, 334 (3rd Cir. 1991); Wakefield v.
Mathews, 852 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1988). The case against an implied waiver of
attorney's fees is even stronger in the case at bar where there was no settlement
agreement and no waiver or release of all claims, but only an agreement to dismiss two
specific claims.
17

Corp., 496 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238 (1985) (affidavits filed in opposition to summary judgment
motion that did not state in detail when, where and by whom the alleged oral agreement
was made, but merely stated in conclusory fashion that an agreement was made were
insufficient); Century Center, Ltd. v. Davis, 473 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494 (1984).
Finally, the Lonettis cite Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995) that
"[settlement agreements are governed by the rules applied to general contract actions"
and that "[u]nder the principles of basic contract law, a contract is not formed unless there
is a meeting of the minds." Even if it were incorrectly assumed for purposes of argument
that the Lonettis are correct that no meeting of the minds on settlement was reached, that
would not assist the Lonettis. If no settlement was reached, then Bilanzich retained his
right to recover attorney's fees pursuant to the Guaranty and Note.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the district court's order
denying Bilanzich's motion for attorney's fees should be reversed and the case remanded
with instructions that Bilanzich is entitled to an award of his reasonable attorney's fees in
an amount to be determined by the district court.
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DATED this / ^ d a y of May, 2005.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
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